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THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFICIT:
APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE ECONOMIC
RECESSION
Christine A. Klein*

In 2007, the nation entered its greatest financial downturn since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. What followed was a period of national introspection.
Although prescriptions for financial rescue varied widely in the details, a
surprisinglybroad consensus emerged as to the underlyingpathology of the crisis.
This Article explores three principal contributing factors and the lessons
associatedwith each that make up this pathology. These factors include: rejecting
rules through deregulation, trivializing risk through overly optimistic analyses,
and overconsumption supportedby reckless borrowingand lendingpractices.
The powerful lessons from this pathology, considered by a stunned nation in the
midst offinancial collapse, apply with equalforce to the growing environmental
deficit, which this Article defines as the unsustainablespending-down of natural
resourceassets. This Article argues that the environment could benefit from a dose
of the same medicine that has been suggested for the economy: enforcing rules
through re-regulation,abandoninginaccuratemodels of cost-benefit analysis that
trivialize risks, and limiting consumption to sustainablelevels.
This Article tells two parallel stories of fiscal and environmental unraveling,
capturing the cultural moment through the often frank admissions of politicaland
intellectual leaders amidst crisis. It features a Section (PartII.A) on the curious
phenomenon of "midnight regulations," including an Appendix showing the most
recent enactments in tableformat.
INTRODUCTION: THE DEBT CULTURE
In August 2007, the United States entered its greatest financial crisis since
the Great Depression of the 1930s. 1 Triggered in part by subprime lending
practices, the crisis deepened as homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. The
*
Associate Dean for Faculty Development and Chesterfield Smith Professor
of Law, University of Florida, Levin College of Law. I gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance of Andrew Beckington.
1.
See generally Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the FinancialCrisis,
BROOKINGS INST., Nov. 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2OO8/l _orgins crisis
_baily-litan.aspx.
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problem spread as banks, poisoned by so-called toxic assets in their portfolios,
restricted the flow of new credit. Overall, home prices fell 18% in 2008.2 In that
year's final quarter, the gross domestic product (GDP) experienced its worst
decline in over twenty-five years.3 By December 2008, the National Bureau of
Economic Research confirmed that the country's economy was in a recession.4 In
response, the stock market dropped 7.7% in one day. 5 In the first half of 2009, the
national unemployment rate climbed to 9.5%6 and consumer confidence was at the
lowest level in recorded history.
As the financial crisis unfolded, many politicians and scholars searched
for a coherent framework to explain what had gone wrong. One prominent report
suggested that the financial maelstrom had spun-off from the nation's evolving
"culture of debt." 8 As the report explained:
When a society creates democratic institutions to encourage thrift,
more people are likely to engage in the positive activities of saving,
conservation, and asset building. When a society fails to nurture
such institutions, limits access to them, or supports institutions
opposed to thrift, more people are likely to over-sPend, fall into
consumerism as a philosophy of life, and go into debt.
Riffing off the theme of debt, New York Times columnist David Brooks
described the "great seduction" of the debt culture, which exposed its victims to
predatory lenders and other opportunists as the country's "moral structure around
money" deteriorated.' ° As Brooks explained, "what happened to ...the nation's
financial system.., is part of a larger social story. America once had a culture of

2.

Catherine Rampell & Jack Healy, Fed Chairman Says Recession Will Extend

Through the Year, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at BI (reporting that the "value of singlefamily homes in 20 major metropolitan areas was 18.5% lower in December than a year
earlier," according to the Standard & Poor's Case-Shiller home price index).
3.
TIMES,

Catherine Rampell, G.D.P. Revision Suggests Long, Steeper Downturn, N.Y.

Feb. 28, 2009, at B3 (noting a 6.2% decline in gross domestic product in the fourth

quarter of 2008, the worst reduction since the recession of 1982).
4.
The NBER is a nonpartisan group, widely recognized as the institution
"charged with making the call for the history books." Michael M. Grynbaum, Dow Plunges
680 Points as U.S. Recession is Declared,INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 1, 2008.
5.
Id. (describing a 680-point drop in the Dow Jones industrial average).
6.
U.S. BUREAU OF LAnOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE
CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY,
http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet
?data tool=latestnumbers&seriesid=LNS 14000000 (last visited Aug. 17, 2009).

7.
Rampell & Healy, supra note 2 (noting that the Conference Board's index of
consumer confidence hit twenty-five in February 2009, representing "the lowest since [the
Board] began tracking consumer sentiment in 1967").
8.
COMM'N ON THRIFT, FOR A NEW THRIFT: CONFRONTING THE DEBT CULTURE
(2009). See Inst. for American Values, Join the Initiative: For a New Thrift,
www.NewThrift.org (visited Aug. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Join the Initiative].
9.
Join the Initiative, supra note 8.
10.
David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Great Seduction, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at
A23 [hereinafter Brooks, The Great Seduction] (describing FOR A NEW THRIFT:
CONFRONTING THE DEBT CULTURE, supra note 8, as "one of the most important think-tank
reports you'll read this year").
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thrift. But over the past decades, that unspoken code has been silently eroded.""
After the culture of thrift had eroded, the country was left with a culture that
embraced "rampant ...financial decadence,
[and] the trampling of decent norms
12
about how to use and harness money.',
Just as the debt culture was part of a larger social story, it was also part of
a larger environmental story. As the nation's attention was riveted to the
unraveling of the financial sector, another crisis was developing in the natural
environment. The same debt culture that decimated financial assets had also long
13
been attacking environmental assets: the nation's stock of "natural capital.'
Although the degradation of the earth's atmosphere by greenhouse gas emissions
received prominent media attention, the accelerating depletion of fresh water,
biodiversity, and other natural resources was less well known.' 4 In the parallel
ecological universe, the environmental deficit was growing silently in the shadow
of the highly publicized fiscal deficit.
In this Article, I argue that the debt culture-with its attendant rejection
of regulation, skewed perception of risk, and reckless borrowing and lending
practices-is a pathology shared by the fiscal and environmental crises. Drawing
on new lessons emerging from the financial sector, I argue that the environment
could benefit from a dose of the same medicine prescribed for the economy:
enforcing rules through re-regulation, abandoning inaccurate models of costbenefit analysis that trivialize the risks of environmental degradation, and limiting
consumption of the country's natural capital to sustainable levels. Together, these
three measures are a prescription for sustainability, which promotes a "new
thrift" 5 to stabilize both financial and natural systems.
Part I considers factors that led to the collapse of the national economy,
identifying three particularly compelling lessons that offer utility well beyond the
financial context. Part II examines a related narrative, that of environmental
decline. This part uses the bookends of 1980-just after the dawn of the modem
environmental era-and early 2009-the end of the George W. Bush
Administration. In retrospect, this period encompasses the rise and potential fall of
the national experiment with deregulation. Part III returns to the lessons uncovered
in the rubble of the fallen debt culture, considering their potential applicability to
the environmental deficit. The Article concludes that a new culture of thrift is
necessary to redress both the financial and environmental deficits.

11.

David Brooks, Op-Ed., The Culture of Debt, N.Y.

12.

Brooks, The Great Seduction, supra note 10.

13.
14.
15.

See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
See supra notes 8-9, infra note 145, and accompanying text.

TIMES,

A19.
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I. THE ECONOMY UNDONE
We are in the midst of a once-in-a-centurycredit tsunami.

-Alan

Greenspan

16

As the economic crisis unfolded, thoughtful analysts reexamined
longstanding paradigms that may have contributed to the collapse. Although this
period of national introspection did not yield a universal consensus, it produced
some startlingly honest admissions. Notably, a significant number of high-level
politicians and commentators were willing to consider-and, at times,
embrace-ideas that would have been anathema just a few months earlier. This
Part highlights three contributing factors to the nation's economic woes and the
lessons associated with each. In conformity with this Article's comparative focus,
the following discussion of three of the main causes of the recent economic crisis
will emphasize the cultural value system that disastrously misdirected both
economic and environmental policy.
A. Rejecting Rules
Beginning about 1980, lawmakers generated considerable political
currency by emphasizing the virtues of the free market unhampered by
governmental rules or enforcement measures. This dislike of regulation morphed
into a deep antipathy toward the federal government itself, including taxation and
other core governmental functions. Deregulation and privatization became the
watchwords of the day.
The anti-regulatory movement, however, gained traction much earlier
than 1980. Ronald Reagan famously set the tone in 1964, asserting that the
nation's Founders intended to restrict the powers of the central government:
A government can't control the economy without controlling
people. And [the Founders knew] when a government sets out to do
that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. They also
knew, those Founding Fathers, that outside of its legitimate
functions, government does nothing as well or as economically as
the private sector of the economy.17
Reagan concluded with the quip, "[G]overnments' programs, once launched, never
disappear. Actually, a government bureau is the nearest thing to eternal life we'll
ever see on this earth."'i
Succeeding Presidents-both Republican and Democratic-took up the
charge. In his 1996 State of the Union Address, President Bill Clinton declared,
"The era of big Government is over," adding the caveat, "[b]ut we cannot go back

16.
The FinancialCrisis and the Role of FederalRegulators: Hearing Before the
Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform, 110th Cong. 3 (2008) (testimony of Dr. Alan

Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve) [hereinafter Greenspan Testimony].
Ronald Reagan, A Time for Choosing (Oct. 27, 1964), available at
17.
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/timechoosing.html.
18.

Id.
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to the time when our citizens were left to fend for themselves."1 9 Later, President
George W. Bush proposed to modify the Social Security program by allowing
younger workers to establish "voluntary personal retirement accounts., 20 The
President explained his proposal in terms that emphasized the virtues of the free
market over government programs:
Here is why the personal accounts are a better deal. Your money
will grow over time at a greater rate than anything the current
system can deliver .... In addition, you'll be able to pass along the

money that accumulates in your personal account, if you wish, to
your children and-or grandchildren.21
The President concluded in terms distrustful of government: "And best of' all, the
,2
money in the account is yours, and the Government can never take it away.
As the economy declined precipitously in 2007, many began to question
their wholehearted faith in the free market. Perhaps the most striking soulsearching of all was undertaken by Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve system from 1987 to 2006.23 During better
economic times, members of Congress lauded Chairman Greenspan for his
service: "You have guided monetary policy through stock market crashes, wars,
terrorist attacks and natural disasters .... You have made a great contribution to

the prosperity of the U.S. and the nation is in your debt.",24 But in 2009, a somber
Greenspan testified for four hours before the House Oversight Committee as it
probed the causes of the economic crisis.25 Speaking of his former unquestioning
faith in the free market unhampered by governmental oversight, the eighty-yearold Greenspan's angst was palpable as he acknowledged that his "whole
intellectual edifice.., collapsed in the summer of last year., 26 Noting that he was
"distressed" to discover "a flaw" in his ideology, Greenspan admitted that "[t]hose
of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to 27protect
shareholder's equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief.
Time Magazine was less circumspect in its assessment, with a February
2009 cover story entitled 25 People to Blame: The Good Intentions, Bad Managers
and Greed Behind the Meltdown.28 As one of the primary offenders, Time named

19.

President William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress

on the State of the Union, 1 PUB.PAPERS 79, 79 (Jan. 23, 1996).
President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress
20.
on the State of the Union, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 126, 129 (Feb. 2, 2005).
Id.
21.
22.
Id.
Chairman Greenspan presided over the Board of Governors from August 11,
23.
1987 through January 31, 2006, serving four presidents over a span of more than 18 years.
24.
Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddu, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House
Panel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2009, at Al (quoting 2005 statement of Representative Jim
Saxton (R., N.J.)).
Id.
25.
Greenspan Testimony, supra note 16.
26.
27.

Id.

Nancy Gibbs, 25 People to Blame: The Good Intentions, Bad Managers and
28.
Greed Behind the Meltdown, TiME, Feb. 23, 2009, at 20.
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Phil Gramm, Chair of the Senate Banking Committee from 1995 through 2000,
criticizing him as "Washington's outspoken champion of deregulation. 29
Likewise, Time's offender number three, Alan Greenspan, was faulted because
"his long-standing disdain for regulation underpinned the mortgage crisis."
Coming in fourth was Chris Cox, the former Chief of the SEC, taken to task for his
failure "to limit the massive leveraging that led to the financial collapse. 30
In 2009, President Obama embraced this lesson concerning the dangers of
deregulation:
Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good
or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is
unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful
eye, the market can spin out of control-and that
a nation cannot
31
prosper long when it favors only the prosperous.
Prominent politicians and analysts on both ends of the political spectrum
went even farther, considering whether the federal government should not merely
exert a "watchful eye," but should also take a temporary ownership interest in
some of the nation's floundering banks.32 This flirtation with nationalization was
astounding. As one television analyst noted, "The idea of nationalization would
have been [politically] radioactive just six months ago, but now we are moving
toward a consensus that this is what will be needed., 33 Republican Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger agreed, distinguishing American practices from European
nationalization:
There's a difference of the way it is in Europe, where the ... federal

government owns some of those banks, whereas here only if there is
a problem financially... the federal government comes in and takes
over and helps out .... And that's a huge service to the people of
34
America, to have that security ....

29.

Id. at 22-23.

30.

Id.

31.
President Barack Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009). Later, President
Obama described excessive deregulatory practices in this way: "Regulations were gutted for
the sake of a quick profit at the expense of a healthy market." President Barack Obama,
Address to Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union (Feb. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
President Obama, State of the Union]. See also Baily et al., supra note 1 (concluding that
subprime lending practices "thrived in an environment of easy monetary policy by the
Federal Reserve and poor regulatory oversight").
32.
The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 authorized the
Department of the Treasury to purchase troubled assets under certain conditions. 12 U.S.C.
§ 5211 (2008). See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 111TH CONG., THE TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: REPORT ON TRANSACTIONS THROUGH JUNE 17,2009 1 (June 2009).
33.

ABC News: This Week with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television

broadcast Feb. 22, 2009) (transcript of comments on file with author). See also Sam Stein,
Bank Nationalization: "As American As Apple Pie", HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 22, 2009,
http://www.huffmgtonpost.com/2009/02/22/bank-nationalization-as-a-n168948.html
(quoting remarks of George Stephanopoulos).
34.

ABC News, supra note 33 (emphasis added). See also ABC News: This Week

with George Stephanopoulos (ABC television broadcast May 13, 2009) (interviewing
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As Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman asserted, "[I]sn't nationalization
un-American? No, it's as American as apple pie." 35
B. Trivializing Risk
The systematic underestimation of risk was a second significant cause of
the recession. As Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan admitted, the modem
risk-management paradigm was deeply flawed, due in part to its trivialization of
risk. As Greenspan explained, "the data inputted into the risk-management models
36
generally covered only the past two decades, [which were] a period of euphoria.,
Greenspan elaborated, noting that37"[i]t was the failure to properly price such risky
assets that precipitated the crisis.
Risk-management paradigms were revealed to be nothing but a house of
cards. Risk was passed off from institution to institution as substandard loans were
pooled together and sold.38 Under such circumstances, even the best models and
data would have difficulty keeping up with what a Brookings Institution report
described as "new kinds of financial innovations that masked risk; ...

companies

that failed to follow their own risk management procedures; and ...regulators and
supervisors that failed to restrain excessive risk taking. ' 39 The report found
"especially shocking" the pervasiveness of the risk underestimation:
What is especially shocking, though, is how institutions along each
link of the securitization chain failed so grossly to perform adequate
risk assessment on the mortgage-related assets they held and traded.
From the mortgage originator, to the loan servicer, to the mortgagebacked security issuer, to the CDO [collateralized debt obligations]
issuer, to the CDS protection seller, to the credit rating agencies, and
to the holders of all those securities, at no point did any institution
stop the party or question the little-understood computer risk
models, or the blatantly unsustainable
deterioration of the loan terms
40
of the underlying mortgages.
With brutal honesty, one loan analyst summed up the problem
of risk assessment:
41
"[A bond] could be structured by cows and we would rate it.

California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger), available at http://i.abcnews.com/ThisWeek/
Story?id=6932196&page=3.
35.
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Banking on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2009, at
A27. In more restrained terms, Alan Greenspan agreed, "It may be necessary to temporarily
nationalize some banks in order to facilitate a swift and orderly restructuring." Id. (quoting
the former Federal Reserve Chairman).
36.

Greenspan Testimony, supra note 16, at 3.

37.
Id. (referring to subprime securities).
38.
Baily et al., supra note 1 ("With the ability to immediately pass off the risk
of an asset to someone else, institutions had little financial incentive to worry about the
actual risks of the assets in question.").
39.
40.

Id.
Id.

41.
Gibbs, supra note 28 (quoting e-mail written by analyst employed by
Standard & Poors).
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C. Reckless Consumption
A third contributing factor of the economic decline was excessive
consumerism, tolerated at the expense of the traditional reverence for thrift and
frugality.42 Americans borrowed freely, financing the purchase of everything from
homes to consumer goods. In 1982, households owed an average of 60% of their
income.43 By 2007, consumer debt had skyrocketed to 130% of income.4 During
the same period, personal savings dropped from 9% to 0.6%.
Such profligate spending, borrowing, and lending was supported by
evolving cultural norms that tolerated, and even encouraged, overconsumption.
Reflecting the angry national mood, Time Magazine's February 2009 listing of
those who caused the financial crisis included the "American consumer" as
number five among the culprits.46 Time scolded:
We really enjoyed living beyond our means. No wonder we wanted
to believe it would never end. But the bill is due .... We've been

borrowing, borrowing, borrowing-living off and believing in the
wealth effect, first in stocks, which ended badly, then in47real estate,
which has ended even worse. Now we're out of bubbles.
Political leaders shared this outrage. As a presidential candidate, Senator John
McCain decried the nation's growing debt as "generational theft. '"48 Likewise,
President Barack Obama expressed his concern for future generations:
Now, if we're honest with ourselves, we'll admit that for too long,
we have not always met [our] responsibilities-as a government or
as a people .... And though [many] challenges went unsolved, we

still managed to spend more money and pile up more debt, both as
individuals and through our government, than ever before ...
42.

Brooks, The Great Seduction, supra note 10.

43.
Gibbs, supra note 28.
44.
Id.
45.
Paul Krugman, Decade at Bernie's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, at A23
(citing 1980-2007 data from FED. RESERVE BD., SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES (Feb.
2009)). Krugman concluded:
[T]here has been basically no wealth creation at all since the turn of the
millennium: the net worth of the average American household, adjusted
for inflation, is lower now than it was in 2001 .... For most of the last

decade America was a nation of borrowers and spenders, not savers.
Id.

46.

Gibbs, supra note 28.

47.

Id. See also Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., Obama's Ball and Chain, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A27 ("This problem is more complicated than anything you can
imagine. We are coming off a 20-year credit binge.").
48.
Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Failure to Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A31
(quoting Senator John McCain, arguing in favor of tax cuts rather than the Obama
Administration's proferred $800 billion stimulus package). See also DONELLA H. MEADOWS
ET AL., LIMITS TO GROWTH: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF
PREDICAMENT OF MANKIND (1972) (predicting that then-current

ROME'S

PROJECT ON THE

levels of economic growth
were unsustainable, supplying short-tenn needs in a way that led to an "environmental
deficit," the consequences of which would be borne by future generations).
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People bought homes they knew they couldn't afford from banks
and lenders who pushed those bad loans anyway.4 9
The President concluded with a sobering call to action: "And all the while, critical
debates and difficult decisions were put off for some other time on some other day.
Well that day of reckoning has arrived, and the time to take charge of our future is
here. 5 °

II. THE ENVIRONMENT UNDONE
It's morning again in America.
-Ronald

Reagan Presidential Campaign 51

The era of deregulation-blamed, in part, by many analysts for the 2008
recession-began innocently enough with the sunny optimism of President Ronald
Reagan. As applied to the environmental realm, the deregulatory period can be
collapsed into the span of a single day: from the "morning" of President Reagan to
the "midnight" regulations promulgated by President George W. Bush. Clearly,
much environmental progress occurred during that time frame-from roughly
1980 through 2008.53 But just as clearly, the deregulatory philosophy-coupled
with the trivialization of environmental risk and the unsustainable consumption of

President Obama, State of the Union, supra note 31.
Id. The President's conclusion continued:
In other words, we have lived through an era where too often, short-term
gains were prized over long-term prosperity, where we failed to look
beyond the next payment, the next quarter, or the next election. A
surplus became an excuse to transfer wealth to the wealthy instead of an
opportunity to invest in our future.
51.
In the 1984 campaign leading to Ronald Reagan's election to a second term
as president, the Reagan campaign ran a television advertisement with the following
narration:
It's morning again in America. Today more men and women will go to
work than ever before in our country's history. With interest rates at
about half the record highs of 1980, nearly 2,000 families today will buy
new homes, more than at any time in the past four years. This afternoon
6,500 young men and women will be married, and with inflation at less
than half of what it was just four years ago, they can look forward with
confidence to the future. It's morning again in America, and under the
leadership of President Reagan, our country is prouder and stronger and
better. Why would we ever want to return to where we were less than
four short years ago?
President Reagan: Leadership That's Working (Ronald Reagan Presidential Campaign
1984).
52.
See infra Part II.C.
49.
50.

53.
See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 2008 REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENT:
HIGHLIGHTS OF NATIONAL TRENDS (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/roehd/pdf/

roe.hdlayout_508.pdf. See also Control of Emissions of Air Pollution From Nonroad
Diesel Engines and Fuel, 69 Fed. Reg. 124, 38,958 (Jun. 29, 2004) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.) (cutting sulfur levels in nonroad diesel fuel in farming,
construction, mining, and industrial engines from 3400 parts per million to 15 parts per
million, estimated to prevent over 12,000 premature deaths annually).
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environmental problems that will pose
environmental assets-ignored looming
54
challenges for many generations.
The flawed paradigm that triggered the recession of 2008 transformed
President Reagan's sunny morning into a long night of epic financial storms. That
same mindset also had ruinous consequences for the natural environment. The
following Sections identify key legal developments that precipitated environmental
decline and highlight the shared philosophical underpinnings of the nation's
economic and environmental policies from 1980 through 2008.
A. Rejecting Rules
Beginning about 1980, the forces opposing governmental regulation grew
increasingly vocal, resulting in a systematic dismantling of numerous
environmental protections. Some of the most powerful deregulatory weapons took
aim at federal administrative agencies, a target largely unnoticed by the general
public and the mainstream media. At least three key changes were instrumental in
limiting the ability of agencies to write new environmentally protective rules.
55
Notably, all three developments involved the executive branch of government.
First, President Reagan began a systematic overhaul of the process through which
administrative agencies develop rules. In 1981, Reagan signed Executive Order
12,291, requiring federal agencies to prepare a "Regulatory Impact Analysis" for
every proposed "major rule."56 The analysis must describe the projected costs and
benefits of the rule. 57 Moreover, the Order established a default presumption
against regulation, with agencies bearing the burden of proving the need for
regulation.58 This sweeping mandate had a particularly chilling effect upon

54.

See infra notes 107-24 and accompanying text.

55.

For a discussion of the recent evolution of the executive power, see Robert

D. Sloane, The Scope of the Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction,

88 B.U. L. REv. 341 (2008).
56.
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194 (Feb. 17, 1981). The
Order defined "major rule" as any regulation that is likely to result in an "annual effect on
the economy of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices ...; or significant
adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or
[competition] with foreign-based enterprises." Id. at 13,193.
57.
Id. at 13,194.
58.
The Order states:
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information
concerning the need for and consequences of proposed government
action;
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential
benefits to society from the regulation outweigh the potential costs to
society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to
society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the
alternative involving the least net cost to society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing
the aggregate net benefits to society, taking into account the condition of
the particular industries affected by regulations, the condition of the
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environmental regulations because the benefits of a healthy environment are
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify in any meaningful way. At the time of the
Order, techniques had not been developed to accurately measure the dollar value
of the human services provided by a healthy environment. 59 Moreover, the costbenefit mindset is incapable of appreciating the idea that, at least in some cases,
the natural environment itself may be simply priceless.60
A second important development took place a decade later, when
President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,866,61 thereby endorsing the
deregulatory movement initiated by President Reagan. The Order strengthened the
presumption against regulation and made the scientific and technical expertise of
regulatory agencies subservient to the political oversight of the President. For
example, the Order's preface expressed a clear bias against federal regulation and
a clear preference for deferring to the free market and the private sector:
The American people deserve a regulatory system that works for
them, not against them: a regulatory system that protects and
improves their health, safety, environment, and well-being and
improves the performance of the economy without imposing
unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society; regulatory policies
that recognize that the private sector and private markets are the best
engine for economic growth; regulatory approaches that respect the
role of State, local, and tribal governments; and regulations that are
effective, consistent, sensible, and
62 understandable. We do not have
such a regulatory system today.
The Clinton Order strengthened the presumption against regulation by
asserting that
[f]ederal agencies should promulgate only such regulations as are
required by law, necessary to interpret the law, or are made
necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of
private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the
public, the environment, or the well-being of the American people.63
With perhaps unintended symbolism, the Order's alphabetized list of
regulatory priorities placed economic concerns before environmental protection.
national economy, and other regulatory actions contemplated for the
future.
Id. at 13,193-13,194.
59.
See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings
ofEcosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007).
60.
See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HE1NZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE
PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 203 (2004).

61.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993). Although the Order
revokes President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291, the Clinton Order draws from the
same underlying philosophy. See id.
62.
Id. Emphasizing his faith in the market system, President Clinton ordered
agencies to identify alternatives to regulation, "including providing economic incentives to
encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing
information upon which choices can be made by the public." Id.
63.

Id.
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As the Order directs, "[I]n choosing among alternative regulatory approaches,
agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits (including
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety, and other advantages;
distributive impacts; and equity)." 64
Most importantly, Executive Order 12,866 weakens the authority of
federal agencies with scientific and technical expertise. In particular, the Order
requires the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)-a subdivision
of the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 65 -to review
significant agency rules before they are finalized. The Order requires OIRA to
"provide meaningful guidance and oversight so that each agency's regulatory
actions are consistent with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the
principles set forth in this Executive order., 6 6 In addition, OIRA has the authority
to "return" proposed rules to agencies for "further consideration., 67 Disagreements
between the agencies and OIRA are to be resolved by the President.68 Although
seemingly benign, the role of OIRA has received severe criticism. As
environmentalist Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. argues:
Practically unknown outside the Beltway, OIRA's power is
unmatched among federal agencies. Its official charter is to review
every economically significant regulation proposed by the federal
government and report the fiscal impacts to the White House.
Federal departments and agencies develop these new regulations
through an open process, guided by expert advice and mandatory
public comment. Typically this takes six or seven years. Then, at the
end of this highly democratic process, these regulations disappear
into OIRA-only to emerge dramatically altered or not at all.69
Kennedy concludes,
"OIRA may be the most antidemocratic institution in
70
government.,
A third important development that has weakened environmental
protection involves so-called "midnight regulations." It has become common
practice for late-term Presidents to focus upon legacy-building during the waning
hours of their administrations.71 Increasingly, Presidents have done so by ordering
the administrative agencies under their control to develop new rules under a
schedule carefully timed to bind the next President. Although this practice is not
64.
Id.
65.
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs was created by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (2006).
66.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 61, at § 6(b).
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE 59 (2004).
70.

Id.

71.
During the George W. Bush Administration, for example, the rate of
rulemaking approvals generally increased each year as the Administration drew to a close.
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) approved 81 final rules in 2005,
92 in 2006, 83 in 2007, and 157 in 2008. See RegInfo.gov, Where to Find Federal
Regulation Information, www.reginfo.gov (last visited Aug. 19, 2009) (tallying number of
OIRA approvals from September 1 to December 31 of each year).
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inherently biased toward deregulation, the most recent spate of midnight
regulations weakened or dismantled previously existing regulatory safeguards,
many in the environmental realm.72
The midnight regulations finalized late in the second term of President
George W. Bush reflect a worldview remarkably similar to the prevailing
economic theory. This view consisted of an unquestioning faith in the political
philosophy of deregulation and a deep distrust of government in general, and the
federal government in particular. The environmental midnight regulations translate
this philosophy into a consistent set of code words-language so bureaucratic and
malleable that it is nearly impossible for the casual reader to discern the core
purpose or likely consequences of the regulations. Words such as "efficiency,"
"flexibility," "voluntary," and "regulatory burden" are ubiquitous in the new
regulations and generally signal that a particular program is aimed at weakening
environmental protection.
For example, in the name of "efficiency," several midnight regulations
substantially weakened a number of environmental protections.73 One regulation,
which was intended to "clarify" existing regulations and to "streamline the
permitting process," allows coal mining activities to be conducted near perennial
or intermittent streams, potentially allowing over 1000 miles of Appalachian
streams to be filled with the debris from mountaintops, blasted off to expose
underlying coal deposits.74 A second regulation, whose purpose was to "clarify"
existing requirements and to produce a process that "is less time-consuming and a
more effective use of our resources, '75 allows federal agencies to conduct activities
that may harm threatened or endangered species without first consulting wildlife
experts.76 A third regulation passed under the auspices of "reduc[ing] reporting
72.

See Appendix.

73.

Id.

74.
Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent
Streams, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,814, 75,816 (Dec. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 780,
784, 816, 817) (promulgated under the authority of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977). See also id. at 75,816 (discussing 1983 amendment to the stream
buffer rule, which had prohibited coal mining activities within 100 feet of watercourses, and
amendment's purpose of "improving the ease of administration and eliminating the
possibility of applying the rule to ephemeral streams and other relatively insignificant water
bodies"). Opponents claim that the 2008 rule would allow coal companies to fill over 1000
additional miles of Appalachian streams with the debris from mountaintop removal coal
mining. See Press Release, Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr. (D-N.J.), Pallone says Bush
Administration's Mountaintop Removal Mining Proposal Threatens Rivers and Streams
(Mar. 30, 2004) (remarks of senior member of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/list/press/nj06_pallone/
pr-mar30_mining.html. But see infra note 167 (noting Obama Administration's judicial
challenge to the rule).
75.
Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, Secretary Kempthome Proposes Narrow
Changes to ESA Consultation Process (Aug. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/08_NewsReleases/08081 Ia.html.
76.
Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
76,272, 76,275 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) (Dec. 16, 2008). But see infra notes
171-72 (revocation of rule).
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burdens on America's farms" exempts farmers from an obligation to report certain
hazardous air emissions from animal waste, potentially applying to feedlots that
generate more raw waste than an entire city. 77 A final example, which was
designed in part to "give the greatest respect to the democratic judgments of State
Legislatures with respect to concealed firearms," weakens the federal prohibition
against carrying concealed weapons in national parks and wildlife refuges by
deferring to state gun law. 8
B. Trivializing Risk
As a counterpart to the economic optimism that led many investors and
borrowers to undervalue risk, environmental optimism led many to simultaneously
underestimate the risks posed by human activities and to overestimate the capacity
of future technologies to counteract environmental damage. As Thomas Friedman,
New York Times columnist and Pulitzer Prize winner, observes, "it's now obvious
that the reason we're experiencing a simultaneous meltdown in the financial
system and the climate system is because we have been mispricing risk in both
arenas-producing a huge excess of both toxic assets and toxic air that now
threatens the stability of the whole planet., 79 This Section considers two of the
most important methods through which environmental risk has been trivialized: the
politicization of science and the requirement of cost-benefit analysis.
First, environmental risks may be underestimated when politicians, rather
than scientific experts, make the relevant calculations. For example, a 2008 report
by the U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, found that a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Fish, Wildlife and Parks and other

77.
Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Better Approach to Reporting Hazardous
Substances from Farm Animal Waste (Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/. See also CERCLA/EPCRA Administrative
Reporting Exemption for Air Releases of Hazardous Substances from Animal Waste at
Farms, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,948 (Dec. 18, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 302, 355) (in
compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act, estimating that "final rule will reduce
burden on farms.., by approximately 1,290,000 hours over the ten year period beginning
in 2009"). In analyzing this rule, the General Accounting Office reported that some
"concentrated animal feeding operations" (CAFOs) generate more raw waste annually than
U.S. cities. See Press Release, Rep. John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), Chairman, Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, Government Report Links Factory Farms to Harmful Air Emissions,
Water Pollution: Lawmakers Question EPA Plan to Loosen Air and Water Reporting
Requirements (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://energycommerce.hluse.gov/Press_110/
I 10nr353.shtml.
78.
General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National Park Service
and the Fish and Wildlife Service, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,966, 74,967 (Dec. 10, 2008) (to be
codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 2). But see infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (describing
subsequent developments).
79.
Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Price is Not Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1,
2009, at A3 1. As Friedman explained, "Whenever products are mispriced and do not reflect
the real costs and risks associated with their usage, people go to excess. And that is exactly
what happened in the financial marketplace and in the energy/environmental marketplace
during the credit bubble." Id. (concluding that a carbon tax is necessary "to price in the true
risks and costs to society from... climate-changing fuels").
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employees had improperly influenced agency decisions in accordance with their
own political views. As a result, the agency withheld the protection of the
Endangered Species Act through more than a dozen agency decisions. 80 The
Inspector General found:
[The Deputy Assistant Secretary] pursued her agenda by exerting
political influence on [FWS offices]. She frequently contested the
scientific findings of FWS biologists and often replaced their
scientific conclusions with her own, even though she was not a
biologist. [The Deputy] also acted as an economist-again without
professional training-in her efforts to restrict critical habitat
81
designations ....
In a second major investigation, the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee considered allegations that government climate change science
had been manipulated to achieve political ends. The Committee asserted, "The
evidence before the Committee leads to one inescapable conclusion: the Bush
Administration has engaged in a systematic effort to manipulate climate change
science and mislead policymakers and the public about the dangers of global
warming." 8 As a result, the risks posed by climate change were deliberately
understated through the editing of scientific reports by non-scientists in the White
House.83

A second method that has systematically trivialized environmental risk is
the mechanism of cost-benefit analysis. At its core, cost-benefit analysis
incorporates assumptions about the risks posed by various unregulated activities
and the associated monetary savings to be realized by reducing risky behaviors. If
the risks are understated, then regulation is less likely to occur. The Environmental
Protection Agency's evolving methodology provides a representative example of
how federal agencies perform this analysis. After President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12,291,84 the EPA issued guidelines in 1983 for analyzing

80.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND POLICY
(Dec. 10, 2008), availableat http://wyden.senate.gov/newsroom/interior-ig-report.pdf.
81.
Id. at 1.
82.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM,
POLITICAL

INTERFERENCE

ADMINISTRATION

WITH

CLIMATE

CHANGE

SCIENCE

UNDER

THE

BUSH

i (Dec. 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/

20071210101633.pdf.
83.
Id. at ii (describing "at least 294 edits to the Administration's Strategic Plan
of the Climate Change Science Programto exaggerate or emphasize scientific uncertainties
or to deemphasize or diminish the importance of the human role in global warming").
84.
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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regulatory impacts, with appendices added in 1991.85
The guidelines were revised
87
in 2000,86 and a second revision is in progress.

Overall, the agency makes a three-part analysis. First, the EPA identifies
the benefits of proposed environmental regulations by listing the types of
"environmental improvements" they are likely to generate.88 These projected
improvements fall into numerous categories, including human health
improvements, ecological improvements, and aesthetic improvements.89 Second,
the agency quantifies the level of anticipated benefits, incorporating assumptions
85.
NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., OFFICE OF POLICY ECON. & INNOVATION, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS,
EPA-230-84-003, Dec. 1983 [hereinafter EPA 1983 GUIDELINES] (reprinted with

Appendices in March 1991), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eerm.nsf/vwAN/
EE-0228A-1 .pdf/$file/EE-0228A-1 .pdf.
86.
See NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., OFFICE OF POLICY ECON. & INNOVATION,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES [hereinafter
EPA 2000 GUIDELINES], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/eerm.nsf/vwSER/

DEC917DAEB820A25852569C40078105B?OpenDocument.
87.
See NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., OFFICE OF POLICY ECON. & INNOVATION,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES, at 2-1
through 2-6 (external review draft, Sept. 12, 2008) [hereinafter EPA 2008 DRAFT
GUIDELINES], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eermfile.nsf/vwAN/EE-0516-

01.pdf/$File/EE-0516-01.pdf (describing statutory and executive order requirements for
conducting economic analyses). Although the header of the draft itself states "DRAFT,
9/15/2008: DO NOT CITE OR QUOTE," the EPA subsequently released the draft on its
website, noting its commitment "to periodically revise the EA Guidelines to account for
further growth and development of economic tools and practices." Nat'l Ctr. for Envtl.
Econ., Office of Policy Econ. & Innovation, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Guidelines for
Preparing Economic Analyses: External Review Draft, http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epal
eerm.nsf/vwRepNumLookup/EE-0516?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). As
explained by the Summary to the 2008 Draft Guidelines:
In an effort to fulfill that commitment [to periodically revise the
Economic Analyses Guidelines], this draft document incorporates new
literature published since the last revision of the EPA Guidelines,
describes new Executive Orders and recent guidance documents that

impose new requirements on analysts, and fills information gaps by
providing more expansive information on selected topics. Furthermore,

to facilitate the adoption of new information in the future, this document
will be released electronically and in a loose-leaf format. This new, more
flexible format will allow future updates and additions without requiring
a wholesale revision of the document.
ld. See also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OMB CircularA-4: RegulatoryAnalysis, available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf, John D. Graham, Adm'r, Office
of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Memorandum to the President's Management Council on
OMB's Circular No. A-4, New Guidelines for the Conduct of Regulatory Analysis (Mar. 2,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/memo-pmc a4.pdf. See
generally Press Briefing, Tony Fratto, Deputy Press Sec'y (Oct. 31, 2008), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081031-6.html.
88.
See EPA 1983 GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at M5; EPA 2000 Guidelines,
supra note 86, at 62-63; EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-2, 7-3, 7-5, and
7-16.
89.
See id.
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about the risks posed if human activities remain unregulated. 90 For example,
human health improvements are based upon estimates of "mortality risk
reductions" and "morbidity risk reductions." 9 ' Similarly, ecological improvements
consider, among other things, avoiding the risks posed by climate change.92
Finally, the EPA monetizes the benefits of potential regulations. 93 To do this, the
EPA seeks to measure the "utility" or "satisfaction" that people derive from the
relevant goods or services.94
Cost-benefit analysis is controversial. Throughout the analysis, several
forces lead to the consistent underestimation of risk. The tendency is more
pronounced in the environmental context, where cost-benefit analysis may lend an
aura of precision to an inherently subjective venture. Federal agencies have begun
to acknowledge that these methodological challenges are significant and can lead
to unreliable results. As the EPA warned in its 2008 draft update to its Guidelines
for PreparingEconomic Analyses, "[E]conomic analysis is but one component in
the decision making process and under some statutes cannot be used in setting
standards." 95 With respect to the estimation of benefits, in particular, the EPA

See EPA 1983 GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at M5-M10; EPA 2000
supra note 86, at 62-66; EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-17
through 7-18 (calling for consultation with experts including human health and ecological
risk assessors).
91.
See EPA 1983 GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at M5-M8; EPA 2000
GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 66-71 and 87-98; EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note
87, at 7-1 (considering "'typical' EPA... regulation that reduces emissions or discharges of

90.

GUIDELINES,

contaminants"). Mortality risk reductions include reduced risk of cancer fatalities and acute

fatalities. Morbidity risk reductions include reduced risk of cancer, asthma, and nausea. Id.
at 7-5.
See EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-11 (identifying
92.
ecological improvements in terms of the "ecosystem services" provided by protected
resources, including "[s]uch valuable ecological functions ... [as] the partial stabilization
and moderation of climate conditions, the regulation of water availability and quality, and
nutrient retention").
93.
See EPA 1983 GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at M8; EPA 2000 GUIDELINES,

supra note 86, at 71-72 (listing three methodologies for the measurement of the benefits of
environmental improvements, including market methods, revealed preference methods, and
stated preference methods); EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-19.
See EPA 1983 GUIDELINES, supra note 85, at M9 (describing a variety of
94.
methods for valuing environmental effects, including the "contingent valuation method,"
based upon what people "would be willing to pay to enjoy alternative levels of
environmental quality"); EPA 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 73 (describing method
that studies "people's behavior in associated markets [to] reveal[] the value they place on
the environmental improvements") and 83-85 (describing "contingent valuation" and
"conjoint analysis and contingent ranking" methodologies); EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES,

supra note 87, at 7-2.
95.
EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 1-1. See also EPA 2000
GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 62 ("One challenge facing analysts of environmental policies
is the lack of a market for most environmental improvements. Because 'cleaner air' or
Icleaner water' is not normally bought or sold, market data are generally not available for
benefit valuation.") and 71 ("Unfortunately, direct markets for environmental goods and
services do not often exist. In the absence of these markets, environmental and natural
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admits that many of its analyses "face several major obstacles." 96 Three such
obstacles are particularly noteworthy.
First, the monetization of benefits is problematic, particularly in the case
of environmental goods for which no market has been established to give an
indication of value. In numerous cases, the EPA simply estimates the benefit of an
environmental improvement, using one of a number of "preference valuation
methods., 97 For example, the EPA may use "willingness to pay"-defined as "the
maximum amount of money an individual would voluntarily pay to obtain an
improvement"-as a proxy for the value of environmental benefits.98 This
methodology is far from ideal, creating the potential to dramatically understate the
value of environmental assets. 99 As the EPA explains, a major obstacle of benefits
analysis "arises from the lack of appropriate analytical tools and/or data with
which to apply them .... [A]nalysts often must either adapt existing tools to the
situation using their best professional judgment or simply leave some benefit
categories non-monetized,"' 00 an admission that, in some cases, the EPA simply
omits environmental benefits from the ledger. As a result, the costs of regulation
would necessarily outweigh benefits monetized as valueless, leading the agency to
conclude that protective rules should not be enacted.
A second flaw of cost-benefit methodology is its use of discounting
techniques. After an agency monetizes costs and benefits, both are "discounted to
present value." This practice is premised upon the assumption that "people prefer
consumption today over consumption in the future, and the fact that invested
capital is productive and provides greater consumption in the future."1 °1 When
benefits will not accrue for several generations, the EPA employs a "social
discounting" analysis. 10 2 In either case, the discounting exercise is premised upon
the assumption that consumption is to be encouraged-a preference that might be
resource economists must rely upon alternative methodologies to measure the benefits of
environmental improvements.").
96.
EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-1.
97.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also EPA 2008 DRAFT
GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-1 to 7-3.
98.
See EPA 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 60-61, 94, 97; EPA 2008
DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-3.
99.
See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond CostBenefit Analysis: A PragmaticReorientation, 32 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 433 (2008).
100.
2000

EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 7-1 to 7-2; see also EPA
supra note 86, at 52 ("Despite analysts' best efforts to assign monetary

GUIDELINES,

values to all of the consequences of an environmental policy, there are instances in which
monetization is not feasible.") and 54 (noting that difficulties of discounting non-monetized
benefits because "sometimes the available measures of benefits are very poor proxies for
ultimate damages").
101.
EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 6-1; see also EPA 2000
GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 33-34.
102.
EPA 2008 DRAFT GUIDELINES, supra note 87, at 6-8. As the EPA explains,

"If costs and benefits can be represented as changes in consumption profiles over time, then
discounting should be based on the rate at which society is willing to postpone consumption
today for consumption in the future." Id. See also EPA 2000

38.
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justified in the context of a fiscal system dependent upon economic growth, but
dangerous when applied to encourage the consumption of limited natural
resources. In a chapter entitled Honey, I Shrunk the Future, one prominent critique
argues:
The notion that adults should teach children to understand and plan
for the future is lost in the new mathematics of impatience ...
[T]he world [our children] will inherit is scarcely worth taking
seriously, its present value too small to outweigh a minor change in
consumption today. Diseases that will affect us decades from now,
environmental crises that will eventually change the earth's climate
for the worse, nuclear and toxic wastes that will be unsafe for
human contact for centuries-all these03and more can be made to
disappear with the flick of an equation.
The authors conclude, "Discounting
society's most profound values endorses
10 4
profligacy and shuns discipline."'
Finally, the excessive use of cost-benefit analysis has been criticized for
its potential to emasculate congressional mandates for environmental protection.
Referring to the independent review by the White House (through OIRA) of all
proposed major environmental regulations, 10 5 some critics allege:
[Traditional cost-benefit analysis] conflicts with the statutory
standards established by Congress for health, safety, and
environmental agencies. Only two of 22 major health, safety, and
environmental statutes rely on a cost-benefit test to determine the
level of regulation. In many cases, the OMB's insistence on
superimposing this imperfect methodology trumps the
considerations that must be the focus of agency decisionmaking: the
06
criteria for decisionmaking established by the statutes themselves.
The EPA's own advisory board has indicated its concern. For example, in its
surprisingly harsh draft critique of the EPA 's 2008 Draft Guidelines, the Science
Advisory Board (SAB) reminded the agency that "only the legislative branch has
the power to

.

promulgate."'' 0

As a result, the EPA "should make clear that while economic

7

.

.

specify what kinds of regulations

[the] EPA might

103.
104.

ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 60, at 203.
Id. The EPA has also acknowledged the difficulties of social discounting. See
EPA 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at 33 ("Despite the relative simplicity of the

discounting concept, choosing a discount rate has been one of the most contentious and

controversial aspects of EPA's economic analyses of environmental policies.").
105.
See supra Part II.A.
106.
Letter from Rena Steinzor, President, Ctr. for Progressive Reform, to the
Honorable Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 5 (Feb. 20, 2009), available at
www.progressivereform.org [hereinafter CPR Letter]. The author is a member scholar of
CPR, but did not participate in the writing of the letter. See also Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1499 (2009) (approving consideration of costs in clean
air regulation).
107.
Letter from Sci. Advisory Bd., Envtl. Econ. Advisory Comm., to the
Honorable Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Science Advisory Board
(SAB) Review of EPA's Draft Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses 1-2 (2008)
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analysis can identify superior policy options, EPA's legal authority defines and
limits its menu of choices. . . . [The EPA should] better inform readers about
rather than mimicking the treatment in
economic analysis that is relevant for 0EPA,
8
environmental economics textbooks."'

C. Reckless Consumption
Until recently, the prevailing wisdom in the economic sector encouraged
a frenzy of borrowing and lending, supported by deregulated markets and a
pervasive denial of the attendant risks. In the environmental realm, similar frenetic
the present generation to spend down the planet's
behavior has encouraged
"natural capital"' 0 9 by consuming environmental resources at an unsustainable
pace. This Section considers two examples that illustrate the depth of the
environmental counterpart to unsustainable economic practices: wetlands
consumption and the ecological "credit crunch."
The first example is microscopic, focusing on one particular resource in
one particular country: wetlands in the United States. The United States has lost

(draft Jan. 28, 2009) [hereinafter SAB Draft Letter], available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/WebBOARD/E8DC14OD2EFOF 1E68525754C0069DD9B/$File/EEAC+
Draft+Advisory+-+Guidelines+for+Preparing+Eco+Analyses+l-28-09.pdf. The header of
the draft itself states "WORKING DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION on March 4, 2009 EEAC
Teleconference. This draft Report does not represent SABEEAC consensus or EPA policy.
It has not been approved by the chartered SAB, Do not cite or quote. 1/28/98."
Subsequently, however, the SAB released the draft on its website for public comment. U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Sci. Advisory Bd. (SAB), Economic Analysis Guidelines Update:
Advisory Meeting and Report Development, Review of EPA's Draft Guidelines for
Preparing Economic Analyses (2008) (draft January 28, 2009), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/SABPRODUCT.NSF/0/2dd3f407cb483bd685257352004b72b7
!OpenDocument&TableRow=2.2#2; see also EPA Sci. Advisory Bd. Staff Office;
Notification of Two Public Teleconferences of the Chartered Science Advisory Board, 74
Fed. Reg. 34,348 (July 15, 2009) (announcing two public teleconferences on August 6,
2009, and August 28, 2009, of the chartered SAB to conduct quality reviews of two draft
SAB reports). The Science Advisory Board was established by Congress to provide
independent scientific and technical advice, consultation, and recommendations to the EPA
on the technical basis for the agency's positions and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 4365
(2006).
SAB Draft Letter, supra note 107, at 2. The SAB has also criticized portions
108.
of the 2000 Guidelines. See EPA 2000 GUIDELINES, supra note 86, at app. A: An SAB
Report on the EPA Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analysis. Overall, the SAB noted,
"Although some concerns remain about particular parts of the Guidelines, our overall
assessment is that the Guidelines are excellent." Id. Among its concerns, the SAB noted that
the "proper application of discounting in an intergenerational context . . . remains
controversial in the published literature" and the quantification of the value of the social
benefits of reducing fatal human health risks "could be refined." Id. app. A, at 3, 5.
See, e.g., Robert Costanza et al., Natural Capital, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
109.
EARTH

(Cutler J. Cleveland ed., 2008);

GRETCHEN

C.

DAILY

&

KATHERINE ELLISON, THE

NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE (2002); PAUL
HAWKEN ET AL., NATURAL CAPITALISM: CREATING THE NEXT INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen

(1999); NATURE'S SERVICES:
C. Daily ed., 1997).
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over half of its original pre-settlement wetlands. In the early 1600s, the area now
occupied by the United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii) included
approximately 221 million acres of wetlands; by 2004, that number had declined to
about 107.7 million acres."O Despite a longstanding national goal of"no net loss"
of wetlands,"' the nation continued to experience an annual gross loss of about
30,000 natural wetland acres from 2001 to 2003.'12
The official reports are more optimistic, made possible through counterintuitive accounting practices that paper over the continuing destruction of
wetlands. For example, in a 2005 report to Congress, Secretary of the Interior Gail
Norton stated:
I am pleased to report that the nation is making excellent progress in
meeting [our national wetlands acreage] goals. For the first time...
wetland gains, achieved through the contributions of restoration and
creation activities, surpassed . . wetland losses. This is the result of
a multitude of governmental, corporate and private partnerships
working together to 3secure and conserve our wetland resources for
future generations. 1
2004,
The report estimated a net gain of 191,750 wetland acres between 1998 1and
4
equivalent to an average annual net gain of approximately 32,000 acres.
How can these reports of gross losses be reconciled with reports of net
gains? Drilling down through the data, it becomes apparent that Secretary Norton's
rosy assessment was made possible only through reliance upon the practice of
"mitigation," which allows natural wetlands to be destroyed in some cases as long

110.

T.E.

DAHL,

STATUS AND TRENDS OF WETLANDS IN THE CONTERMINOUS

UNITED STATES 1998 TO 2004 16 (U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv. 2006) [hereinafter

DAHL,

STATUS AND TRENDS], available at http://www.fws.gov/wetlands/statusandtrends/
index.html; Thomas E. Dahl & Gregory J. Allord, History of Wetlands in the Conterminous
United States, U.S. Geological Survey Water Supply Paper 2425 (1997).
111.
DAHL, STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 110, at 7 (emphasis added). In 1988,
the National Wetlands Policy Forum, a group of twenty state and local officials,
environmentalists, and land developers, recommended that the nation adopt the goal of "no
net loss" of wetlands. That is, although some wetlands may be destroyed by development,
such loss would be mitigated by the creation of new, human-made wetlands. See RESOLVE,
available
at
FORUM
(1988),
WETLANDS
POLICY
INC.,
NATIONAL
http://www.resolv.org/experience/cases/pdfs/wetlands.pdf. Presidents George Bush and Bill
Clinton embraced this goal, at least in theory. In 2005, an even more challenging goal was
set by President George W. Bush: the restoration, improvement, and protection of more than
three million acres in five years.
United States Dep't of Agriculture, Table: Changes in Palustrine and
112.
Estuarine Wetlands on Non-Federal Land and Water Area, in NATURAL RESOURCES
CONSERVATION SERVICE, NATURAL RESOURCES INVENTORY: 2003 ANNUAL NRI, availableat

http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/Technical/nri/2OO3/table4.html (showing gross losses, gross
gains, and net change from 1992 to 2003 in acres per year). Annual gross losses were
reported at 99,000 acres (1992-1997), 53,000 acres (1997-2001), and 30,000 acres (20012003).
113.
DAHL, STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 110, at 7.
Id. at 46.
114.
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as they are replaced through methods such as the creation of artificial wetlands.' 15
Overall, the federal Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) notes three cautionary factors
relevant to the reports' methodology. First, the recent net gains were reported by a
study that measured only the quantity of wetland acreage, not its quality, a
potentially more significant measure of ecosystem health. 1 6 Second, as the FWS
acknowledged, its data does not account for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita during
the summer of 2005, which destroyed vast expanses of coastal wetlands." 7 Finally,
the numbers rely heavily upon wetland mitigation, the creation of artificial ponds
and other aquatic areas to replace natural wetlands. As the FWS reported:
Without the increased pond acreage, wetland gains would not have
surpassed wetland losses during the time frame of this study. The
creation of artificial freshwater ponds has played a major role in
achieving wetland quantity objectives ....
[But] [s]ome freshwater
ponds would not be expected to provide the same range of wetland
values and functions
as [the] vegetated freshwater wetland [areas
18
that they replace].'
Reinforcing this concern about the reliability and effectiveness of mitigation, the
National Research Council reported in 2001 that "[t]he goal of no net loss of
wetlands is not being met," in part because mitigation promises may not always be
fulfilled. As the panel explained, "[lin many cases the construction of substitute
wetlands was often delayed or never finished," and "even when the final result
satisfied regulations, the artificial wetlands did not duplicate the ecological
functions of the natural wetlands that were buried."'" 19
As a second example of reckless environmental consumption, the World
Wildlife Fund's Living Planet Report 2008 drew a direct link between fiscal and
ecological crises: "The recent downturn in the global economy is a stark reminder
of the consequences of living beyond our means. But the possibility of financial
recession pales in comparison to the looming ecological credit crunch."'120 In
particular, the Report noted three disturbing trends. First, it documented a 30%
decline in vertebrate species populations from 1970 to 2005.121 Second, it found
that the worldwide "ecological footprint" had doubled from 1961 to 2005, defining
115.
See Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources, 73 Fed. Reg.
19,594 (Apr. 10, 2008) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 325, 332; 40 C.F.R. pt. 230),
available

at

http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/wetlands-mitigation -final

_rule_4 10 08.pdf. Under the rule, "compensatory mitigation" involves "actions taken to
offset unavoidable adverse impacts to wetlands, streams and other aquatic resources
authorized by [federal] . . . permits." Id. Four methods are possible: 1) the restoration of
previously existing wetlands, 2) the enhancement of existing wetland functions, 3) the
creation of a new wetland, or 4) the preservation of an existing wetland. Id.
116.
DAHL, STATUS AND TRENDS, supra note 110.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 17.
119.
See Andrew C. Revkin, Efforts to Save Wetlands Are Inadequate,Study Says,
N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2001, at A14.
120.
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, THE 2008 LIVING PLANET REPORT 1 (2008),
available at http://www.panda.org/about our-earth/all-publications/living-planet-report/
lpr._2008/.
121.
Id. at 2-3.

HeinOnline -- 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 672 2009

20091

THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFICIT

673

the footprint as "the area of biologically productive land and sea required to
provide the resources we use and to absorb our waste. 1 22 Third, the Report
calculated the "ecological debtor" rate at more than 75%, finding that "more than
three-quarters of the world's people live in nations that are ecological
debtors-their national consumption has outstripped their country's
biocapacity."' 123 In its sobering conclusion, the Report predicted, "Our global
footprint now exceeds the world's capacity to regenerate by about 30 percent. If
our demands on the planet continue at the same rate, by the mid-2030s we will
need the equivalent of two planets to maintain our lifestyles."'' 24 These findings are
reinforced by the United Nations' Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,125 which
concluded that "[o]ver the past 50 years, humans have changed ecosystems more
rapidly and extensively than in any comparable period of time in human history,
largely to meet rapidly growing demands. ... This has resulted
in a substantial and
126
largely irreversible loss in the diversity of life on Earth."'

III. A NEW DAY: REDUCING THE ENVIRONMENTAL DEFICIT
THROUGH RE-REGULATION
[The] day of reckoning has arrived,and the time to take charge of
ourfuture is here.
127
-President Barack Obama

Out of adversity, thoughtfully examined, emerges wisdom. As the nation
learns from its financial mistakes, it may uncover valuable lessons applicable well
beyond the financial sector. Part III of this Article will apply the tentative learning
from the financial crisis to the equally serious challenge of protecting the nation's
environmental resources.

122.
123.

Id. at 14-17.
Id. at 1-3, 16-17 (emphasis added).

124.
125.

Id. at 1.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), initiated in 2001 at the urging

of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, sought to "assess the consequences of
ecosystem change for human well-being and the scientific basis for action needed to
enhance the conservation and sustainable use of those systems and their contribution to
human well-being."
Assessment,

in

World Resource Inst., Overview of the Millennium Ecosystem
MILLENIUM
ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT
(2005),

http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/About.aspx. As the MA website explains:
The MA has involved the work of more than 1,360 experts worldwide.
Their findings, contained in five technical volumes and six synthesis
reports, provide a state-of-the-art scientific appraisal of the condition and
trends in the world's ecosystems and the services they provide (such as
clean water, food, forest products, flood control, and natural resources)
and the options to restore, conserve or enhance the sustainable use of
ecosystems.
Id.

126.
127.

Id.
President Obama, State of the Union, supra note 31.
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A. Taking Responsibility
There is a growing acceptance of the value of federal regulation, at least
to prevent egregious practices harmful to important national interests. In the
context of the financial system, President Obama argued, "Now, if we're honest
with ourselves, we'll admit that for too long, we have not always met [our]
responsibilities-as a government or as a people ....
Regulations were gutted for
the sake of a quick profit at the expense of a healthy market."' 128 In the context of
environmental protection, re-regulatory efforts have focused heavily upon the
abusive potential of midnight regulations-a practice common among Presidents
of both political parties. As one observer stated, "[S]udden bursts of regulatory
activity at the end of a' 29
presidential administration are systematic, significant, and
cut across party lines."'
Executive, administrative, legislative, or judicial action can reverse or
delay the effect of midnight regulations, as illustrated by the fate of many of the
George W. Bush Administration's midnight regulations. 30 In the limited case of
rules that have not yet been published as final in the Federal Register, the
incoming President can impose a moratorium on new rulemaking, as well as order
the postponement of the effective date of rules that have already been published. 131
If proposed rules do not pass muster with the new administration, they need not be
promulgated as final rules. 32 Through a much lengthier process, administrative
agencies can replace undesirable rules through an entirely133 new administrative
rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Congress can also overturn or restrict agency rules. In most cases,
Congress will do so through traditional statutory promulgation. The Congressional
Review Act provides a more expeditious alternative, allowing Congress to
introduce a joint resolution of disapproval of an agency rule within sixty days after
it has been submitted to Congress. 134 If the President does not veto the resolution,
then the rule shall not take effect, either in its original form or in substantially
similar form.' 35 This legislative authority has been used sparingly. As of the end of
2008, Congress invalidated only one of the some 50,000 final rules submitted to it

128.
129.
2001, at 9.
130.
131.

Id.
Susan E. Dudley, Reversing Midnight Regulations,

REGULATION,

Spring

See Appendix col. 4.
CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MIDNIGHT RULEMAKING:

RL 34747, at 1 (updated
Nov. 24, 2008).
132.
Id.
133.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2006) (specifying informal rulemaking
procedures). In some cases, expedited rulemaking may be possible. See Dudley, supra note
129, at 11-12
134.
Congressional Review Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2006). See
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS AND A NEW ADMINISTRATION,

generally

RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY
CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT, RL 31160 (Oct. 10,

2001). The President may veto the joint resolution. Id.
135.
5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2006).
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since the Congressional Review Act was passed in 1996.136 As a third technique,
Congress may target specific rules through language inserted into bills affecting
agency appropriations. 137 In the omnibus appropriations bill passed in 2009, for
example, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to "withdraw or
reissue" two Bush-era midnight regulations,' 38 affecting Endangered Species Act
140
consultations 139 and the listing of polar bears under the Endangered Species Act.
Like Congress and the President, the courts have a role in overseeing
agency rulemaking. Through judicial review of agency action, a court may
invalidate agency rules on a number of grounds,' 4 1 including cases where a

136.
COPELAND, supra note 131, at 13 (discussing disapproval of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration's November 2000 final rule on
ergonomics).
137.
Id. at 15.
138.

Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-008, § 429, 123 Stat. 524

(2009). Section 429 provides,

(a) During the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of
this Act [March 11, 2009](1) the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce may
withdraw or reissue the rule described in subsection (c)(1) without

regard to any provision of statute or regulation that establishes a
requirement for such withdrawal; and
(2) the Secretary of the Interior may withdraw or reissue the rule referred
to in subsection (c)(2) without regard to any provision of statute or
regulation that establishes a requirement for such withdrawal.
(b) If the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Commerce (or
both) withdraws a rule under subsection (a), such Secretary shall
implement the provisions of law under which the rule was issued in
accordance with the regulations in effect under such provisions
immediately before the effective date of such rule, except as otherwise
provided by any Act or rule that takes effect after the effective date of
the rule that is withdrawn.
(c) The rules referred to in subsection (a) are the following:
(1) The final rule relating to "Interagency Cooperation under the
Endangered Species Act", issued by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service and signed November
26, 2008, by the Assistant Secretary of Fish and Wildlife and Parks of
the Department of the Interior and the Deputy Assistant Administrator
for the Regulatory Programs of the National Marine Fisheries Service.
(2) The final rule relating to "Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; Special Rule for the Polar Bear", issued by the Assistant
Secretary of Fish and Wildlife and Parks of the Department of the
Interior on December 10, 2008.
139.
Id. at § 429(c)(1). See supra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing
rule). See infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (discussing revocation of rule).
140.
Id. at § 429(c)(2).
141.
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (scope of review of
agency action).
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1 42
regulation represents an abuse of discretion
or an unreasonable or impermissible
43
interpretation of relevant legislation.

B. Acknowledging Risk
Beyond re-regulation, cost-benefit reform will be necessary to curb the
growing environmental deficit. As Chairman Greenspan learned to his dismay,
fiscal risk-management models failed disastrously due to the input of
unrealistically optimistic data.' 44 Applying this lesson to the environment, a firststep reform could narrow the circumstances under which the cost-benefit
methodology is employed. Currently, as critics note, cost-benefit analysis is
applied indiscriminately as a "one-size-fits-all technique applied to policy
problems as varied as regulating mercury emissions from power plants to the roof
strength standard for new automobiles."'145 Moreover, the analysis is unnecessarily
redundant. First, action agencies determine whether rules are necessary to achieve
statutory goals, and then the White House OIRA office determines whether such
rules advance the President's political goals. 146 The second review is particularly
susceptible to abuse. As critics complain, the OIRA review "has served mainly to
suppress regulation thought to be excessive."'' 47 To rectify this problem, OIRA
must adopt a new paradigm, one that encourages and supports agencies in their
congressionally mandated 48
missions to protect the environment and the public
health, safety, and welfare.1
As a second reform measure, cost-benefit analysis must develop
techniques to provide an accurate monetization of environmental benefits. This
need was underscored by the Science Advisory Board, in its draft critique of the
EPA's 2008 Draft Guidelines. As the SAB explains:
[W]e urge the Agency to vastly expand its guidance on
characterizing non-monetized benefits. We recommend that the
Guidelines incorporate the concept of ecosystem services and its
various components . . . and highlight treatment of ecological
systems and services in benefit-cost analysis. Users of the
Guidelines should be warned that an inappropriate focus only on
impacts that can be monetized can provide misleading
policy
49
guidance (as with other cases of asymmetric information). 1

142.
See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983)
(setting forth standards for invalidating agency action as "arbitrary and capricious" under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
143.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
144.
See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
145.
Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 99, at 435.
146.
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
147.
CPR Letter, supra note 106, at 2.
148.
The Center for Progressive Reform argues that "[riather than chiding
agencies for their alleged excesses," the OIRA should rescue agencies by "giving them
adequate resources to fulfill their statutory mandates, helping them develop strong proactive
agendas, and ensuring they receive enhanced legal authority to take decisive action." Id.
149.
SAB Draft Letter, supra note 107, at 15.
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At the least, as the SAB urges, the EPA should clarify the limitations of its
analysis by labeling its compilation of aggregate monetized benefits as "total
monetized economic benefits" rather than "total benefits."1 50
As an even broader reform, some have suggested that environmental costbenefit analysis should be replaced with a new analytical approach-the so-called
"pragmatic regulatory impact analysis."' 51 Under the proposed methodology,
agencies would first consider whether environmental harm (or anticipated harm)
poses a risk sufficient to trigger regulation under applicable statutes. 152 If such
threshold has been crossed, then agencies should regulate up to the level
authorized by Congress. 153 Proponents believe that this proposed pragmatic
regulatory impact analysis will be more faithful to congressional mandate and will
provide a more accurate assessment of environmental risks by eliminating costbenefit's "emphasis on pinpoint benefit estimates...
[that] has the effect of hiding
154
the underlying uncertainties in the risk evidence."'
C. Consuming Sustainably
Reversing the trend of unsustainable consumption will require both legal
and cultural change. For almost a half century, Congress has imposed a
sustainability mandate upon federal agencies. For example, the National Forest
Service must assure that its forest plans conform to principles of "sustained yield,"
defined as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual
or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the national forests
without impairment of the productivity of the land."1 55 But that mandate has been
weakened in actual practice. Now we must breathe new life into the commitment
to sustainability, recognizing that our very lives may depend upon the success of
that effort.
A growing social movement has already begun to lay the cultural
groundwork for change. For example, a diverse group of national leaders launched
a "new thrift" campaign in 2008, calling for the creation of new institutions to
promote a culture of thrift.' 56 Others have called for change at the individual level,
150.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Sci. ADVISORY BD., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
VALUING THE PROTECTION OF ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND SERVICES (2009); MILLENNIUM
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: OPPORTUNITIES AND
CHALLENGES FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY (2005).
151.
See, e.g., Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 99; CPR Letter, supra note 106,
at 6-8.
152.
CPR Letter, supra note 106, at 6 (discussing the concept of "risk trigger").
153.
For example, the statutory standards under the Clean Air Act and the Clean
Water Act require regulation to provide an "adequate margin of safety" or implement the
"best" technologies for pollution control. Id.
154.
Id. at 7.
155.
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (2006)
(defining of "sustained yield"); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §
1604(e)(1) (2006) (requiring assurances that forest plans incorporate sustained yield
principles).
156.
Sheila Weber, A New Trend Toward Thrift: Leaders Launch National
Campaign to Confront the Debt Culture, REUTERS, May 5, 2008 (describing the call for
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such as the "not so big house" movement.1 57 Focusing specifically upon natural
resources, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has issued a call to turn back the tide
and work toward sustainability.15 8 In an attempt to reduce the globe's "ecological
debt"--the amount by which our demand for environmental resources exceeds or
overshoots the earth's biological supply-the WWF has broken down the
"overshoot" into smaller, manageable "sustainability wedges."' 159 The wedge
approach suggests workable strategies to address the environmental deficit in areas
such as energy conservation, vehicle efficiency, population growth, and
overconsumption. 160
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A PARADIGM OF THRIFT
The economic lessons discussed in this Article point toward thrift as a
long-term antidote to the financial crisis. An interesting array of forces have
embraced this notion, offering hope that the parallel call for reducing the
environmental deficit through thrift may fall upon fertile cultural soil. Prominent
among these forces is the nonprofit, nonpartisan Institute for American Values and
its "For a New Thrift" campaign.' 6' Other support for thrift comes from lessexpected sources, such as Citigroup. Launching a new credit card in 2009 during
the same period when the bank was flailing, Citibank lectured young people about
2
the rewards of fiscal responsibility under the slogan "I am Generation Forward":16
I am Generation Forward.
I look not backward, but forward.
I reject the selfish ways of the past.
The environment, the economy, our very security...
"creation of a pro-thrift institutional environment that would encourage financial health,
regular savings and wealth building for all Americans"), http://www.reuters.com/
article/pressRelease/idUS 124537+05-May-2008+PRN20080505 (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
157.
•See SARAH SUSANKA, THE NOT So BIG HOUSE: A BLUEPRINT
WE REALLY LIVE (Taunton Press, 10th anniversary ed. 2008).
158.
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 120, at 22.

FOR THE WAY

159.
Id. at 23, figs.33 (gap between supply and demand) and 34 (sustainability
wedges).
160.
Id. at 22-29.
161.
See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Some have likened the 2007
financial crisis to a "near-death experience," triggering the resolve to change bad behavior
such as Wall Street's reduction of debt relative to equity, or "deleveraging." See Geoff
Colvin, A Return to Thrift: Main Street Should Follow Wall Street's Example When it
Comes to Deleveraging, CNNMONEY.COM, Oct. 30, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/

10/29/magazines/fortune/thrift colvin.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008103005 (arguing
that "Main Street should be deleveraging too").
162.
See Madlen Read, Citigroup's Loans Using TARP Grow to $ 44.75B,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 11, 2009. The irony of this new campaign was not lost on

commentators. One asserted, "Citigroup--the mega-bank that managed its own finances so
badly that it has required three taxpayer bailouts totaling at least $45 billion so far-is
preaching fiscal responsibility to young people." Vindu Goel, Citi Urges MySpace Users to
Spend Wisely, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/citiurges-myspace-users-to-spend-wisely/.
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I believe in sharing the wealth, spreading the peace, helping the
unfortunate, recycling, alternative energy sources, exercise, eating
healthy, giving back, spending wisely and setting a good example.
I believe in good design, keeping my word, paying on
time, using
63
the Internet instead of paper and fiscal responsibility.'
Perhaps the nation will learn from its past mistakes. The economic
tsunami has hit. 164 The culture is churning. The day of reckoning has arrived. 65
What result will follow? As early signs suggest, perhaps the reckoning will take
the form of a new culture of thrift to address both the fiscal and environmental
deficits.

163.
MySpace, Citi FORWARD by
citiforward (follow "Read the Manifesto" hyperlink)
164.
See supra note 16 and accompanying
165.
See supra note 50 and accompanying

MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/
(last visited Aug. 18, 2009).
text.
text.
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APPENDIX
Bush Era Midnight Regulations
(selected examples)
Topic

Citation

Description

Water
Pollution

73 Fed. Reg.
70,418
(Nov. 20,
2008)

Confined animal feeding
operations: Allows CAFO
owner/operators, rather
than agency, to determine
whether CAFO has duty to
apply for discharge permit.

73 Fed. Reg.
33,697 (June
13, 2008)

Water transfers: Exempts
water transfers from
NPDES permitting
requirements.

73 Fed. Reg.
77,882 (Dec.
19, 2008)

Fugitive emissions rule:
Weakens "new source
review" requirements by
excluding specified
"fugitive emissions" from
threshold calculation.

73 Fed. Reg.
76,948 (Dec.
18, 2008)

Hazardous farm emissions:
Exempts certain hazardous
farm animal waste
emissions from reporting
requirements.

Air
Pollution

Response
(current as of 6/1/2009)

EPA granted request for
reconsideration under
Clean Air Act
§ 307(d)(7)(B) and stayed
rule for three months (Apr.
24, 2009).166

166.
See Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to John
Walke, Clean Air Dir., Natural Resources Def. Council (Apr. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/NRDC.pdf.
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73 Fed. Reg.
77,954 (Dec.
19, 2008)

Emission-comparable fuels
rule ("ECF rule"): Creates
new exclusion to Resource
Conservation and Recovery
Act disposal requirements
for, and permits burning of,
certain hazardous
secondary materials.

EPA announced intention
to propose rule
withdrawing ECF rule;
petitions for judicial review
stayed pending completion
review
of administrative
67
process.'

73 Fed. Reg.
64,668 (Oct.
30, 2008)

Definition of solid waste
("DSW rule"): Creates new
conditional exclusion to
Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act requirements
for certain hazardous
secondary materials by
redefining "solid waste";
critics allege rule will
deregulate over 100,000
16
tons of hazardous waste.

Sierra Club filed petition
for administrative stay of
rule; petitions for judicial
review stayed pending
completion of
review
administrative
169
process.

See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Announces Next Steps on
167.
Two Hazardous Waste Rules (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter EPA Announces Next Steps],
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e51 aa292bac25b0b85257359003d925f/
e595d762cb308a89852575ad004be7de!OpenDocument.
Earthjustice, EPA to Deregulate Over 100,000 tons of Hazardous
168.
Waste, http://www.earthjustice.org/library/factsheets/epa-must-come-clean-about-plans-toderegulate-hazardous-waste.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2009).
169.
See Definition of Solid Waste Public Meeting, 74 Fed. Reg. 25,200 (May 27,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 260-261) (announcing public meeting in connection
with review of Sierra Club petition); EPA Announces Next Steps, supra note 167.
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73 Fed. Reg.
75,814 (Dec.
12, 2008)

Stream buffer zone rule:
Creates exceptions to the
buffer-zone rule that allows
mountaintop coal mining
waste to be deposited into
perennial and intermittent
streams.

Secretary of the Interior
filed petition to vacate
Stream170 Buffer Zone
Rule.

73 Fed. Reg.
69,414
(Nov. 18,
2008)

Oil shale leasing: Opens 2
million acres of western
federal lands to oil shale
development,

After court issued
preliminary injunction
against oil and gas leasing
on 77 contested parcels in
Utah, 71 Interior Secretary
Ken Salazar withdrew
leases; 172 DOI "Hayes
Report" concludes that
challenged oil and gas
leases were procedurally
flawed.' 73

170.
See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Salazar Moves to Withdraw
11th Hour Mountaintop Coal Mining Rule: Restores Protections Against Dumping in
Streams (Apr. 27, 2009) available at http://www.doi.gov/news/09_NewsReleases/
042709.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Obama Administration
Takes Unprecedented Steps to Reduce Environmental Impacts of Mountaintop Coal
Mining, Announces Interagency Action Plan to Implement Reforms (June 11, 2009),
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/ wetlands/pdf/MTMRelease 6-11-09.pdf; Siobhan
Hughes, Obama Seeks to Reverse Mountaintop-MiningRule, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2009, at
A6 (describing Justice Department lawsuit to invalidate rule).
171.
S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Allred, 2009 WL 765882 (D.D.C. Jan. 17,
2009) (mem.).
172.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Interior
Review Shines Light on Controversial Utah Oil and Gas Leases (Jun. 10, 2009), available
at http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/newsroom/2009/june/NR 0611_2009.html; see also
Mark Jaffe, SalazarHalts Oil-Shale Leases, DENVER POST, Feb. 26, 2009, at B-01.
173.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO SECRETARY KEN SALAZAR
REGARDING THE POTENTIAL LEASING OF 77 PARCELS IN UTAH (Jun. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.doi.gov/utahreport/.
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73 Fed. Reg.
76,272 (Dec.
16, 2008)

Interagency Cooperation:
Narrows circumstances
under which federal action
agencies must consult with
expert wildlife agencies
(Fish & Wildlife Service
and National Marine
Fisheries Service).

Fish and Wildlife Service
revoked rule under the
authority of the Omnibus
Appropriations Act of
2009174 and reinstated the
regulations that were in
effect immediately before
the effective date of175the
Dec. 16, 2008 rule.

73 Fed. Reg.
76,249 (Dec.
16, 2008)

Polar Bear Special Rule:
Sets forth specific
prohibitions and exceptions
under § 9176 of the
Endangered Species Act
for the threatened polar
bear, 177 but allows
"incidental takes" of polar
bears caused by activities
that occur outside the
current range of the
species, such as the
emission of greenhouse
gases that contribute to the
melting of Arctic sea ice. 178

The Obama Administration
affirmatively decided to
retain the Bush
Administration rule. A
press release announced,
"We must do all we can to
help the polar bear recover,
recognizing that the
greatest threat to the polar
bear is the melting of
Arctic ea ice caused by
climate change....
However, the Endangered
Species Act is not the
proper mechanism for
controlling our nation's
carbon emissions ..

179

174.
Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524
(2009).
Interagency Cooperation Under the Endangered Species Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
175.
20,421 (May 4, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402).
The protections of § 9 of the Endangered Species Act do not apply
176.
automatically to species listed as "threatened," rather than "endangered." 16 U.S.C. § 1538
(2006) (prohibiting the "take" of species listed as endangered). Instead, the applicability of
§ 9 to threatened species is determined by rule on a case-by-case basis. Endangered Species
Act § 4(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2006) (providing that for threatened species "the Secretary
shall issue such regulations as he deems necessary and advisable to provide for the
conservation of such species" and the Secretary may by regulation extend the protections of
§ 9(a)(1) to threatened species).
The polar bear was listed as threatened based upon the findings that "polar
177.
bear habitat-principally sea ice-is declining throughout the species' range, that this
decline is expected to continue for the foreseeable future, and that this loss threatens the
species throughout all of its range." Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants;
Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus) Throughout Its
Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
178.
73 Fed. Reg. at 76,254-76,255. See also Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Salazar Retains Conservation Rule for Polar Bears, Underlines Need for
Comprehensive Energy and Climate Change Legislation (May 8, 2009), available at
http://www.fws.gov/news/NewsReleases/showNews.cfm?newsld=20FB9OB6-A 188-DB0104788E0892D91701.
179.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 178 (concluding that instead of
controlling carbon emissions through the Endangered Species Act, "we need a
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73 Fed. Reg.
74,039 (Dec.
5, 2008)

Bureau of Land
Management: Revokes
Congress's authority under
emergency conditions to
withdraw BLM lands from
development.

73 Fed. Reg.
74,966 (Dec.
10, 2008)

National Parks: Lifts 25year ban on carrying
loaded weapons in national
parks.

[VOL. 51:651

After a federal district
court preliminarily
enjoined rule,' 80 Congress
voted to allow park visitors
to carry loaded guns if
181
allowed by state law.

comprehensive energy and climate strategy that curbs climate change and its
impacts-including the loss of sea ice"). See Andrew C. Revkin, U.S. Curbs Use of Species
Act in ProtectingPolarBear,N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A13.
180.
Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C. 2009) (issuing preliminary injunction against rule and finding that the rulemaking
process had been "astoundingly flawed").
181.
See Credit Card Accountability, Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-24 (May 22, 2009) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The gun
provision was attached to unrelated legislation enforcing new consumer-protection
measures against credit card companies. See id. at § 512 (entitled "Protecting Americans
from Violent Crime").
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